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1. Introduction 
The broad aim of this essay is the juxtaposition of two ostensibly very different cultures. This 
juxtaposition is the context within which the narrower focus is aligned, namely that of the 
comparison of the Xhosa and Roman law concerning marriage. 
The essay begins with an exposition of the relevant components of the two legal systems 
that are being placed in contrast. The first section is thus devoted to the Roman law of 
marriage, while the second comprises the Xhosa. Facilitation of exposition involved 
separating each body of law into parts under pertinent subheadings (development and 
character of the law; the couple; initial advances; engagement; the ceremony; consequences; 
termination). 
Having described each in isolation, the two legal systems are then brought together in the 
third section; the comparison consists of several sections, highlighting points of both striking 
concurrence and serious discrepancy. At the end of this section, a tentative and preliminary 
conclusion has been drawn, which is fully explicated in a final, summary conclusion. 
2. Roman law of marriage 
2.1 The development and character of Roman law 
The law is not static by nature, but in a constant state of adaptation: adaptation to changing 
social norms and moral values. What was law two hundred years ago could very well be a 
senseless custom in contemporary times. Society changes, continuously, and therefore the 
law that is adhered to by that society must change, out of necessity, for where there is not the 
adherence there is simply not the law. 
The legal system of the ancient Romans developed through several phases. Due to the 
literacy of the Romans, this development is easily discernible, but it also necessitates a 
certain nicety of focus in this discourse: for the purposes of this examination of Roman law 
the emphasis has been placed, for the sake of relevance more than anything else, on the law 
as it stood during the time of the Principate.1 
                                                 
1. The Principate is that period of Roman history, commencing with the reign of Emperor Augustus, during 
which an undivided Roman empire was ruled by a single emperor. 
http://akroterion.journals.ac.za
http://akroterion.journals.ac.za
DE WET ESSAY 
 
112 
The primary state of the law of the ancient Romans was the customary or traditional ius 
civile.2 This set of customs was passed on from one generation to the next, in the way of any 
tradition. In speculation one could say that it was inherited from the tribal era of the early 
Latins; it survived as the legal system of the Romans for three hundred years after the 
founding of Rome in 753BC. 
The marked interest in expansion exhibited by the early Romans (and throughout most of 
the history of the nation, for that matter) placed an obligation upon their law to adapt to an 
empire that was steadily increasing in size. The obligation was met by the introduction of 
legislation: Roman reverence of the ius civile was too strong to allow for the outright 
alteration of the latter, but they were not opposed to gentle modification thereof, by means of 
legislation. 
A further point worthy of mention is the separate legal dispensation for foreigners (i.e. 
inhabitants of conquered regions), the ius gentium, which existed apart from the ius civile, to 
which only Roman citizens (including those peoples who had been granted Roman 
citizenship) were subject. Due to its need to cater for a diverse range of cultures and customs, 
the ius gentium was far more general in nature. Over the course of time there was much 
borrowing between the two systems, and the distinction fell away in 242AD.3 
Various bodies and offices were established to pass legislation. The most important of 
these was the Senate, which was, for most of the duration of the Principate, subject to the will 
(and whim) of the emperor. 
At that time, much of Roman law was casuistic,4 meaning that it consisted of a body of 
previously encountered legal situations or actiones (actions); a person only had recourse to 
the courts if their situation matched one of these actiones. But that was the law of procedure. 
Insofar as we are concerned with the law of marriage here, the latter was a part of the ius 
civile, and had not undergone significant change since tribal times.5 
Roman law was extensively codified. The law is therefore accessible to posterity: one 
simply has to read it. It need not be mentioned that this is an advantage enjoyed by literate 
societies in the retention of their history for later generations.6 
2.2 The couple 
The sole requirement for the validity of a Roman marriage was the presence of conubium 
between the intending parties. Conubium can be described as the permission according to all 
other laws to contract the marriage.7 By conducting an examination of the factors that 
excluded conubium, one may gain knowledge of what the requirements were in turn for 
conubium itself. 
The fundamental principle was that civis Romanus has conubium with civis Romana,8 to 
the exclusion of all others, except for certain peoples under Roman dominion who had been 
                                                 
2. Du Plessis 1999:24. 
3. Du Plessis 1999:28. 
4. Du Plessis 1999:25; Thomas 1990:22. 
5. Which is hardly surprising: the respect that Romans had for their traditional law was lasting. 
6. As will become further apparent in the next section. 
7. Corbett 1969:24; Thomas 1990:420. 






granted conubium.9 Thus, it was possible for cives Romani to marry peregrini (foreigners), 
but only if the latter had been the subjects of said concession.10 
There were several other reasons for an absence of conubium between a man and woman.11 
By the time of the early Principate, social class was no longer a bar to marriage. The law 
progressed from prohibiting “cross-caste” marriages entirely (mainly from 750BC to 450BC, 
which was the period during which the plebes or lower class were not recognised as citizens 
of Rome), to simply entailing a loss of status on the part of the member of the upper class 
who was party to such a marriage, to no prohibition or sanction at all. Obviously, as is the 
case in any society, the classes tended to keep to themselves, with wealth being the barrier, 
and such unions would have been frowned upon. 
Slavery was an impediment to a legal marriage: no civis Romanus could legally marry a 
slave.12 Also, freedmen and women could not marry persons born free.13 
There were certain degrees of relationship which excluded conubium. These varied 
considerably over the course of Roman history,14 but for the sake of brevity they can be 
described as virtually identical to what we have today, with the notable exception that the 
Romans did place a prohibition on the marriage of former in-laws.15 
As concerns the man and woman themselves, they both had to be of marriageable age: the 
male at least fourteen years of age, and the female twelve, which made them pubes and 
viripotens respectively.16 
Having established various impediments to conubium, the effect of its absence begs 
attention. In the absence of conubium, the marriage was not necessarily void. If the union 
violated a principle such as the prohibited degree of blood relationship, it was a punishable 
crime, but if it had merely been concluded in the absence of conubium, the sole consequence 
was the absence of the in potestate status of the children of that marriage, which means that 
the children took their status in law from their mother (very much like “bastards” in Victorian 
England). A marriage in which the parties lacked conubium was referred to as a matrimonium 
iniustum, as opposed, of course, to a matrimonium iustum in which the man and woman had 
conubium. The children of the latter were born in potestate and thus fell under the patria 
potestas of the father. 
2.3 Initial advances 
The initial advertisement of marital intent was often made by the father of the intended 
bride/groom, i.e. the paterfamilias under whose patria potestas the bride/groom fell. 
One should not, however, nurture the impression that the paterfamilias necessarily chose 
partners for his children; the children would usually voice the intention of marriage, and 
                                                 
9. Ibid. 
10. Conubium was granted more and more widely in the empire in the course of time: Corbett (pp. 24-30) 
provides a detailed and exhaustive description of progress in this regard. 
11. Let it be stated at this relatively early stage that Roman marriage was heterosexual and monogamous in 
nature. 
 
12. In fact, slaves could not marry each other: the union was seen as a de facto one which was referred to as 
contubernium (Corbett 1969:30). 
13. Thomas 1990:422. 
14. Sometimes in order to accommodate the fancy of an emperor. 
15. Thomas 1990:421-422. 
16. Thomas 1990:421. 
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name the proposed partner, and the father would then act as an intermediary between his own 
child and the family of the other.17  
Men who had acquired the toga virilis and were thus emancipated from their father’s 
potestas were allowed to make advances of their own. Very often they would visit the father 
of the woman in person and present their case. To the woman, however, no such action was 
ever possible, since she remained permanently in potestate (in either her father’s or, should 
she marry, her husband’s).18 
The father was able to exert a great influence over his daughter’s choice of husband; it was 
expected of him to find a suitable man. This duty often involved the rejection of “unworthy” 
young men.19 Suitability depended upon such factors as wealth and social connections, as 
well as the usual considerations, such as the strengthening of business relationships between 
two families or the consolidation of political alliances. 
2.4 Engagement 
Engagement or betrothal came into existence as the culmination of the preceding section. 
Once a suitable match had been detected and the parties had made a mutual promise of 
marriage, the couple was engaged. Breach of engagement carried a penalty which varied over 
the centuries.20  
Children could be engaged by the paterfamilias; the age restriction in this regard was 
seven years for both boys and girls.21 Once again, the paterfamilias had the final say in his 
daughter’s affairs in this regard, while not such great influence in those of his son, who could 
refute his propositions, something that his daughter was not always in a position to do.22 
2.5 The ceremony23 
The wedding almost invariably took place in the house of the bride, because one of the 
central parts of the ceremony was the leading of the bride to the bridegroom’s home, hence 
the expression uxorem ducere.24 
The key to the ceremony was the expression of mutual consent to the marriage by the 
parties. This consent was confirmed by the joining of the right hands of the couple by a 
married woman (who was specifically not a widow) called a pronuba. 
Once this ritual had taken place, the bride was taken from her mother (often with 
simulated force, to represent the rape of the Sabines), and borne to the bridegrooms house, 
although not by the groom himself. This procession was known as deductio in domum maritii 
(or, more simply, a pompa), and was accompanied by torches and other symbolic items such 
                                                 
17. A well-known example being Cicero and his “Tulliola” (Treggiari 1993:127). 
18. Ibid: so, for example, we see Cicero arranging his daughter Tullia’s third marriage, when she was thirty. 
19. Treggiari 1993:126; Corbett 1969:4. 
20. Corbett 1969:2. 
21. Such betrothals were made particularly for the reasons cited in the last paragraph of the previous section. 
22. The law on the capacity of daughters to reject their fathers’ wishes is in dispute. Corbett 1969:2-7. 
23. The account supplied here of the wedding ceremony is not supposed to be comprehensive in cultural aspect: 
it is merely a summary of the actions having legal significance. An exhaustive description of the full 
traditional itinerary of a Roman wedding could well run into several pages. 
24. And even today, it is a Western tradition for the bridgroom to carry his bride over the threshold of the house 






as coins, a spindle, and a distaff. The bridegroom went ahead of this procession, in order to 
receive his wife at their new home. 
The marriage was not complete until consummation had taken place.25 
2.6 Consequences 
The single most important consequence of a valid marriage was that the bride passed into the 
potestas of her husband. This change in status had the implication that any issue of the 
marriage would be born in potestate and therefore derive legal status from the father.26 
It was particularly in the upper classes that a bride came with a dowry (dos): this was a 
sum of money or collection of property that was presented by her family to the husband. It 
was not a compulsory element of the marriage, but it was important in that, firstly, it 
distinguished the marriage from a more casual liaison, and secondly, it had a certain 
regulatory influence on the behaviour of the husband towards his wife, since he had to return 
the dowry if she left him. 
2.7 Termination 
A Roman marriage was terminated in the same ways as contemporary Western unions are: by 
death or divorce. Romans also regarded incest (incestus superveniens)27 as a reason for the 
termination of the marriage. 
As stated previously, the dos had to be returned to the family of the wife on the 
termination of the marriage. Very often, upper class families would draw up contracts prior to 
the marriage in which the distribution of the dowry on the termination of the marriage was 
determined. 
Where the wife had engaged in grossly immoral behaviour, the husband was entitled to 
retain a portion of the dowry, but, nevertheless, the fact that he had to give most of it back if 
his marriage fell apart obviously affected his treatment of his spouse. The money was 
supposed to be used for household expenses and for the support of the wife whom it 
accompanied. 
3. Xhosa law of marriage 
3.1 The development and character of Xhosa law28 
The obvious is usually a good place to begin, and so, regarding the law of all the indigenous 
peoples of South Africa,29 and, more specifically, the Xhosa, the obvious difference with the 
                                                 
25. Treggiari 1993:168. 
26. By means of the so-called “agnatic” bond with the father: Thomas 1990:21 and 428. 
27. Thomas 1990:425. 
28. When dealing with Xhosa law, one has to be general: the smaller tribes that fall under the name Xhosa may 
each have practised their version of “Xhosa” law, but at the same time each version would not have been so 
different from another as to make a generalised extraction impossible. 
29. Where the term “indigenous peoples of South Africa” has been used it refers to those tribes resident in the 
area of what is presently South Africa midway through the seventeenth century. 
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law of the ancient Romans is that the African law was never codified by the people who 
practiced it.30 
For this reason, it is impossible to trace the development of Xhosa law in the same way 
that was done for Roman law in Section 2. What is very clear is that Xhosa law, like Xhosa 
art and traditions, was passed down orally from one generation to the next. 
Xhosa law is thus customary law: it is followed “as it always has been.” There are no 
books of statutes or collections of cases to consult in dealing with a matter: there is instead a 
body of traditions and rituals of behaviour that are followed so closely and without exception 
that they are regarded as law. Xhosa law is thus an illustration of the principle that there is no 
law without respect for the law: Xhosa law is that only because it enjoys adherence; it has 
never been “passed” and it is not “policed.” This point is further borne out by the death of the 
traditional law, particularly in the urban areas, due to people who simply no longer adhere to 
it. 
There were also extensive attempts by the Apartheid government to modify the customary 
law of the tribes. The former had great difficulty in dealing with polygamy and bridewealth 
(ikhazi in Xhosa, or, as it is better known to some people in Zulu, ilobolo), and passed all 
kinds of contrived legislation to “regulate” these practices, when the simpler alternative was 
not to tamper with them at all. What I would like to state in this regard is that the Xhosa law 
of marriage that I have summarised here is that which was practiced before it suffered any 
European influence, i.e. the law as it was at least before midway through the seventeenth 
century. 
3.2 The couple 
In Xhosa tradition a man was eligible to marry after he had undergone the initiation process 
for men (ungeniso), the key feature of which was the rite of circumcision. This process 
usually took place between the ages of fifteen and twenty. 
Women also became marriageable after their respective process of initiation, which 
generally took place at a younger age, perhaps twelve or thirteen. 
Marriage was not allowed between relatives within the prohibited degree of consanguinity, 
which was almost invariably to the fourth degree. Also, marriage to a member of the same 
clan (isiduko) was not allowed.31 
3.3 Initial advances 
A proposal of marriage was usually made by the man, although proposals from the family of 
the woman were not uncommon.32 33 The prospective parties never made the proposals 
                                                 
30. This presents a particular problem of analysis, in that the people who did write the law down were usually 
Christian European missionaries who experienced severe abhorrence at certain customs of the Xhosa tribe, 
particularly the custom of polygamy (isithembu). 
31. Every Xhosa person has a clan name, which is supposed to refer to a common ancestor of all persons with 
that particular clan name; therefore, marriage to a person of the same clan would be, to use the Western 
term, incestuous (Bekker 1989:123). 
32. Traditional Xhosa marriage was polygynous, i.e. a husband could have several wives. The term 
“polygamous” simply means having several spouses. 






themselves: this was done by a family member, who would convey a message of intention to 
the other family.34 
3.4 Engagement 
The success of the proposal relied on the father of the woman (or, if he was dead or absent 
indefinitely, on another male relative, upon whom, according to the patrilinear social 
structure of the Xhosa, the responsibility of guardianship had fallen). If the father did not 
consent to the marriage, there was none. 
Once the father of the woman had consented, the amount of ikhazi or bridewealth was set, 
and until that set amount (usually of livestock)35 had been paid to the woman’s family by the 
man’s family, no marriage could take place. Once the amount had been set, however, the 
couple was formally engaged.36 
A factor which could have a decisive bearing on the decision of the woman’s father was 
the approval of the proposition by the father of the man, but only if it was to be the man’s 
first marriage. The reason for this was simple: if the father of the man did not approve of the 
match, he would have nothing to do with it, thereby leaving a young man of no substantial 
possessions to raise the ikhazi (bridewealth) for the woman himself, something which he 
would not be expected to achieve; at least, the father of the woman would not rely on his 
achieving it. Therefore, in the case of a man’s first marriage, if his father refused to 
countenance the match, i.e. refused to provide ikhazi, the marriage usually would not take 
place. 
At this point it seems appropriate to provide some definition of ikhazi or bridewealth. 
Ikhazi was a payment to the family of the bride on acceptance of a proposal of marriage by 
her father.37 Now, the purpose of this payment has often been misconstrued by inflexible 
analysis based solely on principles of Western morality and also on imperfect observance of 
the practice. The payment of ikhazi does not constitute the “sale” of a woman; it is not her 
“price”.38 
Stated broadly, ikhazi can be seen as a kind of compensation that is paid to the family of 
the wife for their loss of her reproductive capacity. A marriage that ended without issue 
therefore obliged the woman’s father to return the entire ikhazi to the man’s family, because 
the woman’s reproductive capacity was still entirely intact. 
At the same time, the payment of ikhazi was a way of guaranteeing the welfare of the 
woman for the rest of her life, especially in cases where she was left a widow. The fact of the 
matter is that the person to whom the ikhazi was paid, i.e. the woman’s guardian, retained his 
role as her protector, and had to support her if she sought his counsel, for whatever reason 
                                                 
34. Although an independent adult man with no family might well make the proposal himself, but always to the 
woman’s guardian. 
35. Upper class women usually would have an ikhazi consisting exclusively of cattle, while women of lower 
social standing could have such stock as goats and sheep in their ikhazi. The value of cattle to the Xhosa 
was, and is, very high; in current times, ikhazi is calculated using the price of cattle as a guide. For 
example, if a woman’s ikhazi is deemed to be four head of cattle, and the price of cattle is estimated at 
R5 000 a head, her ikhazi will be set at R20 000. 
36. Bekker 1989:97. 
37. Bekker 1989:150, for a full history of the institution. 
38. This particular misconception could be based on the fact that different women “command” different 
“prices”. This is not true; ikhazi varied according to social class and wealth of family, in exactly the same 
way as a Roman dowry: the woman had nothing to do with its determination. 
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(for example, if there was a marital dispute). This need on the part of the woman for this 
lifelong “insurance” was due to the fact that a woman was, according to Xhosa law, a 
permanent “minor”, i.e. she always had to have a guardian. 
3.5 The ceremony 
Once payment of the ikhazi had been completed, the wedding could take place. The key event 
of the ceremony of marriage was the action of ukuthwala: the handing over of the bride to the 
bridegroom.39 This action symbolised the passage of the woman from her own family into the 
family of the man, into which she was then assimilated. 
However, this action could only take place once the groom and the bride’s father had 
consented to the marriage. Without the consent of either there could be no marriage. The 
consent of the bride probably was not required, although clarity does not exist on this point.40 
The ceremony was almost invariably accompanied by great feasting. Consummation of the 
marriage was not necessary for it to be concluded; it was possible for a woman to be handed 
over to her husband’s family, and thus married, in his absence. The crucial action was the 
handing over.41 
3.6 Consequences 
Marriage lent a heightened social status to the couple; they were regarded as a new family 
unit in the community. For the wife, marriage meant a transition from the protection and care 
of her father to that of her husband.42 
A Xhosa man could have more than one wife, and very often did.43 Xhosa wives were 
ranked relative to one another in order of chronology of marriage;44 the first wife was the 
main or grand wife, and headed the entity known as the “great house” (indlu enkulu). The 
second wife was the head of the “right-hand-house” (indlu engasekunene). The third wife was 
the head of the “left-hand-house” (indlu engasekhohlo). Subsequent wives were assigned 
alternatively to the great, right-hand and left-hand houses, and were known as the amaqadi 
(literally “rafters” or “supporting beams”) of those houses, decreasing rank as they increased 
in number. This ranking of wives had all the force of law; it could not be altered by the 
husband, who was the head of the entire household.45 
The importance of a wife’s rank only became apparent in matters of succession: the first 
son of the highest ranking house inherited the father’s property, which was the entire 
household. All things being equal, this would have been the first son of the great wife. Thus a 
man with many wives was assured of having a son as a male heir.46 
3.7 Termination 
                                                 
39. Bekker 1989:108. 
40. Bekker 1989:106; the problem is that European intervention made the bride’s consent compulsory, so it is 
virtually impossible to ascertain whether or not it was originally. 
41. Bekker 1989:109. 
42. The glaring similarity to Roman law will be elaborated upon in the next section. 
43. There was no maximum number of wives; obviously, a limit was set by the ability of the man to pay ikhazi. 
44. Bekker 1989:126. 
45. Bekker 1989:128. 
46. Where he did not have a son, a senior male relative would inherit his property, according to principles that 






The termination of a Xhosa marriage involved simply the return of the woman to her father or 
guardian. 
The causes for termination were numerous and the consequences varied according to who 
was deemed to be at fault: the husband or the wife.47 The basic principle that condenses from 
the large number of possible situations is that if the wife was at fault, her father or guardian 
was obliged to return the ikhazi (with a certain amount deducted from it for every child that 
the wife had borne in the marriage), but if the husband was at fault he forfeited the ikhazi that 
he had paid through his unacceptable behaviour.48 
The three main instances of termination of a Xhosa marriage were the following: death, 
mutual agreement, or at the instance of either party. Reasons for the husband wanting to end 
the union included incestuous behaviour on the part of the wife, persistent adulterous liaisons 
by her, her own rejection of the marriage, or some physical defect of the wife, but only where 
this defect was concealed from the man before the marriage was concluded.49 
Alternatively, the husband could end the marriage simply at his whim, in which case he 
forfeited the ikhazi. 
The wife could also end the marriage, but she had to do this in conjunction with her father 
or guardian. Reasons for her wanting to do this included abandonment, ill-treatment, an 
accusation of witchcraft, impotence, and incest. Obviously, due to the polygynous nature of 
Xhosa marriage, a wife could not take offence at “adultery” committed by her husband.50 
4. A comparison of Xhosa and Roman law of marriage 
4.1 Ikhazi and Dos 
There is a fundamental difference between the Roman institution of dos and the Xhosa 
institution of ikhazi: ikhazi was the most important aspect of a Xhosa marriage, while dos was 
not even a compulsory feature of a Roman marriage, although it was almost invariably 
present in the arrangement.51 Then there is also the obvious difference of direction; in Rome, 
the money went with the woman to her husband, while in Xhosa custom the money went 
from the man to the father of the woman. 
However, despite these differences, the effect of both institutions on the marriage would 
actually have been exactly the same: in either culture, a husband’s mistreatment of his wife 
could have cost him a large amount of property. As regards the wife, both the dos and the 
ikhazi were provided for her benefit, as a means of ensuring her welfare. 
It seems, then, that the motivations behind either the Roman or the Xhosa institution were 
extremely similar, if not the same outright. Therefore, there exists under this heading a 
striking similarity between the two cultures. 
                                                 
47. For an exhaustive list, see Bekker 1989:172-213. 
48. And more will be said about this in the next section, because the parallel with the Roman institution of dos 
is, once again, glaringly obvious. 
49. This last reason needs to be understood in light of the fact that a Xhosa marriage could be concluded in the 
absence of the man. 
50. It should not be assumed that it was impossible for a Xhosa man to commit adultery, i.e. he was obviously 
not allowed to engage in a liaison with a married woman.  
51. Thomas 1990:425. 
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4.2 Potestas and Ubugcini 
In the matter of guardianship over the wife another parallel between the two cultures is 
present. 
In Xhosa tradition, a woman resided under the guardianship of a male. The society was 
patriarchal; marriage simply entailed her passage from the guardianship of her father to that 
of her husband. Roman law, on the other hand, implied precisely the same shift on the part of 
the woman. 
One may observe, then, that the potestas of a Roman paterfamilias was exactly the same 
concept as the ubugcini (from the verb –gcina, to hold or keep) of the Xhosa head of the 
household. 
4.3 Paterfamilias 
In fact, the concurrence described in the preceding section becomes even stronger when one 
observes that it stems directly from the authority of the male head of the household, in either 
culture. 
While an exposition of the status of this head of the household in either culture would 
require a fairly lengthy account, what is obvious is the similarity between the Xhosa and 
Roman versions. It is submitted that the Roman paterfamilias and the Xhosa head of the 
household were identical in status. If, for any reason, this was not the case, it is submitted that 
they were at the least very strong cultural equivalents of one another.52 
4.4 Ceremony 
As will be apparent from the descriptions of the wedding ceremonies above, Roman and 
Xhosa weddings were very similar in a single respect: they both involved the handing-over of 
the bride to the family of the husband. 
This is not something that will seem logical to the contemporary mind: in both Roman and 
Xhosa weddings the bridegroom did not need to be present. In the case of the Xhosa, 
consummation was not even essential to the validity of the union. This may seem rather a 
tenuous manner of conducting a wedding when contrasted with the current Western version, 
but nevertheless it must be borne in mind that, because our current ceremony evolved from 
the Roman one, traces of the Roman ceremony remain to this day in our weddings: the father 
of the bride “hands her over” to the groom. 
The fact that the groom could be married in his absence in both Xhosa and Roman 
tradition emphasises the nature of marriages in these cultures as unions between the 
respective families, and not merely between the individuals at the heart of the ceremony. 
4.5 Polygamy and Monogamy 
Polygamy is something that is entirely alien to the Western Calvinist psyche, and it would 
have been equally as much to the Romans. On the other hand, a Xhosa person would not have 
understood why a man should be limited to a single wife. 
                                                 






But the difference in cultures is simply that: a difference in cultural outlook. It is not 
necessary to dwell upon the issue. The author would like to submit that, seen from the 
outside, any culture is trying to do the same thing as any other culture, namely to survive, and 
that the central unit of any cultural society is, therefore, the family. Different cultural laws 
regarding the family are merely different facilitations of the satisfaction of the same basic 
need. This is the tentative conclusion promised in the introduction. 
5. Conclusion 
At the outset it was stated that the central intention of the author was to juxtapose two 
cultures which are, on the surface, extremely different. In order to effect this contrast, a 
cultural element that is present in both, namely the institution of marriage, was chosen as the 
basis for making the comparison. 
On a very superficial level, then, this essay has shown that while, in certain aspects, 
Roman and Xhosa marriage were very different in appearance, they are, in fact, strikingly 
similar concerning vital characteristics. 
However, on a much deeper level, this similarity extends to the purpose of the institution 
itself in society, and it is when we engage the matter on this level that a far greater, 
overarching concurrence between the two cultures is revealed: in both cultures, both the 
intention and the outcome of marriage were exactly the same: the formation of a new family 
unit. 
This premise cannot be abandoned there, because it leads to a further conclusion: since 
marriage is or was present in any culture that exists presently or that has existed in the past, 
anywhere in the world, it does not seem to be too great a bound of assumption to suppose that 
all cultures are structured to support a single purpose, namely the survival of the community, 
thereby rendering all other cultural distinctions utterly superficial. 
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